Did the Administration Believe Iraq Had WMDs?
Why the Stress on WMDs?
Questions have arisen about America’s rationale for engaging in warfare against Iraq. The Bush administration put forth a number of reasons. Democracy needed to be established in the Arab Middle East community. Saddam was a bad man. Saddam was oppressing his own people. Saddam had ties to terrorists, even Al Qaeda. Saddam used WMDs against his own people and Iran. Saddam had and continued to both develop and stockpile WMDs, even an active and advanced nuclear weapons program.
Paul Wolfowitz, with the DOD, stated that although we recognized many reasons for attacking Iraq:
The truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. government bureaucracy we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on which was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason. Vanity Fair, July 2003
This telling statement informs us that America could not agree on any of the other reasons for going to war. Wolfowitz, in the same Vanity Fair interview, admitted, for example, that intelligence connecting Saddam with terrorists or 9/11 was not that definitive or reliable. He claimed that only the WMD data was rock solid.
At the time that sounded good. There were dissident voices even then, particularly Scott Ritter, Joe Wilson, and the WMD inspection team (a litany of names could be supplied). Wolfowitz dismissed them as “borderline issues” in the solid WMD intel.
Recent developments seem to belie that claim. A British government memo from July 23, 2002 that was described as “extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.” declared:
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy Matthew Rycroft: 23 July 2002
The value of this memo has been criticized as coming from the opinions of a low level bureaucrat. It needs to be corroborated or disproved by contemporary and subsequent actions. There is considerable evidence to support its conclusions. We list but a few examples that have been well reported.
1. The Iraq/Nigerian yellow cake debacle.
2. The aluminum tubes misrepresentation.
3. The 45-minute WMD attack exaggeration.
4. The mobile WMD labs misrepresentation.
5. The possession of decade-old chemical/biological weapons described as viable, but known to have shelf lives rated in months rather than years.
6. The possession of unmanned aircraft capable of delivering payloads to the United States (obviously exaggerated).
7. The threat of a “mushroom cloud” “smoking gun” discovered too late.
All of these claims were thoroughly debunked by those in the best position to know at the time they were proffered. Nevertheless, even when debunked by American and British intelligence, and in some cases removed from speeches as unfounded, they resurfaced time and again and were stated as fact. History shows that the memo from Mr. Rycroft was exactly on target. Furthermore it comports with the Wolfowitz declaration that the administration decided on WMDs as the single issue that was “bureaucratically” viable.
Perhaps it is worthwhile to note just who this Mr. Rycroft is. I cite a brief bio:
In 1995-96 Matthew was head of the political section of Eastern Adriatic Department in the FCO; in this role he was a member of the British delegation to the Dayton peace talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina.
After two years in the FCO’s Policy Planning Staff covering European and trans-Atlantic issues, Matthew joined the British Embassy in Washington. There he followed American domestic politics from 1998 to 2002.
From 2002 to 2004, Matthew was Private Secretary to the Prime Minister Tony Blair, for Foreign Affairs, covering all foreign, European, Northern Ireland and defence issues. He received a CBE for this work in 2004.
Matthew became Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina in March 2005. British Embassy, Sarajevo web page
It is obvious that this memo did not come from a low level aide or other insignificant person, but from one of the highest level members of the Blair administration. It should also be obvious he believed the source to be credible enough to share this top secret memo with others.
We should finally be aware that bureaucratic resistance (cited by Wolfowitz) in the USA has huge components dependent on public opinion and congressional approval. It is clear from a wide range of public statements that neither of those monoliths would have supported the war without an imminent threat based on WMDs.
Actions VS Words
We have seen above that nearly a year before the beginning of war a secret British memo suggested intel was being manipulated to support belief in the presence of WMDs in Iraq. We cited a short list of examples of that manipulation to show the suggestion was accurate. The administration has suggested the intel was excellent, and in fact was agreed with by the world at large. We have shown a limited list that demonstrates it was neither reliable nor believed by experts who were in positions to know the real facts. In the case of Joe Wilson he was sent specifically to investigate the yellow cake story. He reported the effort to purchase never occurred, there was no evidence of either a sale or credible inquiry, and that the documents appearing to support such a sale were obviously forged. All of that data collected by a man specifically sent to investigate the story made no difference and the information was cited by the President himself as proof we needed to overthrow Saddam by military action.
In view of this duplicity of actions it is appropriate to inquire whether the administration actually believed its hype. The style of this president makes that a realistic possibility. He is well known for surrounding himself with true believers and distancing himself forcibly from those who disagree with his positions. A case in point is his bioethics committee studying stem cell research. The world’s leading scientists issued a written protest when he removed the only leading stem cell researchers from that committee because they disagreed with his policy. He replaced them with clerics who sided with him. Here is a relevant citation regarding that firing.
Blackburn's Feb. 27 dismissal came little more than a week after the left-leaning Union of Concerned Scientists accused the Bush administration of distorting scientific findings and manipulating experts' advice to avoid information that runs counter to its political beliefs.
In its wake, some 170 researchers have signed an open letter to President Bush protesting Blackburn's treatment. The American Society for Cell Biology, which represents 11,000 scientists worldwide, complained that it reflects a pattern of politics trumping science in the White House. USA Today, March 19, 2004
We cite this example, not to criticize the action, but to show the President’s pattern for dealing with dissenters. Understanding that pattern illuminates his often used phrase, “there is no doubt in my mind.” It is probably true that he has no doubt, though part of that resolute decision is a refusal to listen and heed contrary opinion.
The administration frequently cites its own firm belief, and the concurrence of most of the world regarding Iraq WMDs, as a major cause for the Iraq war. One can hardly expect someone needing to justify his actions to admit he really lacked convincing evidence even if it were the case. Some go so far as to state that Bush lied about the matter. Assuming this possibility, would you ask a liar if he lied? One would have to look elsewhere for real evidence.
Jesus once remarked “Ye shall know them by their fruits.” By fruits, he meant what they actually did rather than what they said. Without judging the words, therefore, that administration spokespeople have used to describe their beliefs, we will examine their actions. We will do this by comparing two different intelligence chains received prior to the outbreak of combat. We will examine both the intel and the response taken to deal with the threats. The first case concerns Iraq’s oil fields. Here are representative citations from the days before and days just beginning the war.
"We can confirm reports that (Saddam) has taken measures to booby trap oil wells by wiring the wells so that one person can blow them up," said Defense Department spokeswoman Megan Fox. Thursday, March 20, 2003 AP
Worries have mounted in recent weeks that Iraqis have rigged their oil wells with explosives in hopes of slowing a US-led attack and making the country's oil wealth worthless for any new government. The Pentagon insists it will try to secure Iraq's oil fields quickly to prevent Iraqi forces from damaging the country's 1,685 wells. SMH.com.au March 21 2003
This was a crucial target for the coalition forces. In the first hours of the war, US Marines stormed across the Kuwaiti border. It's an area that produces 60% of Iraq's oil and it was important to take it intact. BBC Tuesday, 25 March, 2003
Good afternoon. Ladies and gentlemen, since the coalition's entry to Iraq, coalition forces have been focused on the objectives of the ampaign. Brigadier General Vincent Brooks, CENTCOM April 6, 2003
Summarizing these statements, before the war intelligence said Saddam would try to sabotage his oil fields. We believed that intelligence, and took immediate measures to insert troops into those fields. (In face, we parachuted troops into both the northern and southern oil fields to provide immediate security,) Brigadier General Brooks declared that as part of the focus of the objectives of the war. There is no doubt in my mind that the administration believed the oil fields would be sabotaged. Their actions were in total harmony with that belief.
There was obviously some urgency connected with preserving the oilfields. Had they been set on fire the environmental damage would have been large. Even under UN sanctions considerable oil was feeding the world markets and we could not afford that the flow might be cut off. We were also expecting Iraqi oil to finance the conflict and pay for the rebuilding of that country. So it was necessary to act on our intelligence and keep the oil fields from extensive damage.
We will now compare declarations and actions concerning Iraq’s WMDs. It is clear from the Administration’s statements that we did not go to war over the oil. Their mantra was “If we wanted Saddam’s oil we would just buy it from him.” Forgetting the spurious nature of the argument (we couldn’t buy under sanctions, or give Saddam money to really develop WMDs), let’s just accept it and say that the oil was important enough to immediately dispatch troops to protect it.
By the administration’s own account, WMDs were far more important than Iraqi oil. We cite a very few of thousands of declarations on the import of WMDs in the decision to go to war.
By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. Bush, “State of the Union,” 1/29/2002
We know that the regime has produced thousands of tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas, sarin nerve gas, VX nerve gas. And surveillance photos reveal that the regime is rebuilding facilities that it had used to produce chemical and biological weapons. Bush Cincinnati, 10/7/2002
With every step the Iraqi regime takes toward gaining and deploying the most terrible weapons, our own options to confront that regime will narrow. And if an emboldened regime were to supply these weapons to terrorist allies, then the attacks of September the 11th would be a prelude to far greater horrors. Bush, UN General Assembly, September 12, 2002
The problem here is that there will always be some uncertainty about how quickly he can acquire nuclear weapons. But we don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud. Condoleezza Rice, 9/8/2002
We have seen that those who hate America are willing to crash airplanes into buildings full of innocent people. Our enemies would be no less willing -- in fact they would be eager -- to use a biological, or chemical, or a nuclear weapon.
Knowing these realities, America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof -- the smoking gun -- that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud. Bush Cincinnati, 10/7/2002
The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. Saddam Hussein has held numerous meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists, a group he calls his "nuclear mujahideen" -- his nuclear holy warriors. Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear program in the past. Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.
If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year. And if we allow that to happen, a terrible line would be crossed. Saddam Hussein would be in a position to blackmail anyone who opposes his aggression. He would be in a position to dominate the Middle East. He would be in a position to threaten America. And Saddam Hussein would be in a position to pass nuclear technology to terrorists. Bush Cincinnati, 10/7/2002
From all the above statements it is clear that the Bush administration viewed WMDs as very important reasons to go to war. It is further clear that a critical reason was to prevent WMDs from falling into the hands of terrorists.
The administration is equally clear that they knew where these weapons were. They cited satellite photos for chemical and biological sites and for nuclear sites as well. They provided some of these photos labeled with legends and showing the sites outlined with circles and squares. There were also maps with sites designated on them. In harmony with the evidence of these pictures Rumsfeld said we knew where these weapons were.
…where weapons of mass destruction were dispersed. We know where they are. They're in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and east, west, south and north somewhat. Rumsfeld, Meet the Press, March 30, 2003
If we wished to keep those WMDs we so fervently believed Iraq possessed, even a rapidly progressing nuclear program, out of the hands of terrorists, it was vital that we reach those locations quickly and thoroughly secure them like we did the oilfields. Newsweek, in fact, reported:
From the very start, one of the top U.S. priorities in Iraq has been the search for weapons of mass destruction. Newsweek, May 19, 2003
It is at this point that our credulity is seriously challenged. The same Newsweek article goes on to state:
In the rush to Baghdad, Coalition forces raced past most suspected WMD sites, and looters took over. Newsweek, May 19, 2003
Condoleezza Rice, in a series of television interviews, defended President George Bush's decision invade Iraq, arguing Washington may never learn the whole truth about Iraq's weapons capabilities because of looting, which U.S. forces failed to stop immediately after the invasion.
If Washington truly believed that Iraq's "weapons of mass destruction" might fall into the hands of terrorists, critics say, it would have done more to protect the sites where such materials might have been available. Instead, seven nuclear facilities in Iraq have been ransacked by looters, while the US has yet to reply to a request from the International Atomic Energy Agency to visit the sites. Looting has also scattered much of the evidence that might have existed about WMDs. The Independent, May 11, 2003
In the weeks after Baghdad fell in April 2003, looters systematically dismantled and removed tons of machinery from Saddam Hussein's most important weapons installations, including some with high-precision equipment capable of making parts for nuclear arms, a senior Iraqi official said this week in the government's first extensive comments on the looting. The Iraqi official, Sami al-Araji, the deputy minister of industry, said it appeared that a highly organized operation had pinpointed specific plants in search of valuable equipment, some of which could be used for both military and civilian applications, and carted the machinery away. Dr. Araji said his account was based largely on observations by government employees and officials who either worked at the sites or lived near them. "They came in with the cranes and the lorries, and they depleted the whole sites," Dr. Araji said. "They knew what they were doing; they knew what they want. This was sophisticated looting." The threat posed by these types of facilities was cited by the Bush administration as a reason for invading Iraq, but the installations were left largely unguarded by allied forces in the chaotic months after the invasion. New York Times March 13, 2005
What? Are we to believe that a top priority of the war, finding and securing WMDs was totally ignored in the “rush to Baghdad?” How can we even begin to believe that a war conducted to keep WMDs out of terrorist hands was so grossly mismanaged by the forces on the ground as to allow looters (terrorists and all that the Bush administration claimed Saddam was harboring) to come in and cart away hundreds of tons of chemical and biological weapons, research equipment, and research notes?
When one compares what we did about the oil fields with our behavior toward WMD sites it becomes clear that our security leaders either did not believe the WMD rhetoric or they blundered so severely that every one of them should have been demoted and disgraced as was the female general in charge of Abu Ghraib. The fact that nothing has been done to sanction those who developed a war plan that left all WMD sites (including nuclear sites) strongly suggests that there was no real belief that the WMDs existed.
Evidence for Consciousness of Guilt
When examining the likelihood that a criminal was aware of wrongdoing (as in insanity cases or misguided information) we look for behavior that suggests consciousness of guilt. For example, was a body hidden? Was the weapon destroyed? Were there efforts to cover up the crime? Were there efforts of misdirection and distraction?
Now that we have examined the rhetoric leading up to the Iraq war and seen that subsequent actions during the war are inconsistent with that rhetoric, the question arises as to whether evidence exists for consciousness of guilt.
Some of what will be presented here includes widely circulated stories for which there appears to be neither follow-up nor efforts to discredit. The sensational nature of the stories makes this seem passing strange to me. Barring future reactions, we can only conclude that the proponents of the stories were satisfied when there was no rebuttal, and those who might have been hurt by them felt they were too preposterous to respond to, or that it was better to let sleeping dogs lie.
Did the Bush administration attempt to plant WMDs in Iraq during the war? We had questions about the wisdom of depending on American WMD inspectors conducting the searches because suspicion might arise over their objectivity. We was chagrined when we read two widely circulated accounts suggesting efforts were made to actually plant WMDs in Iraq. The first was from a supposed whistleblower, Nelda Rogers, who averred:
… that a US covert-operations team had planted "Weapons of Mass Destruction" (WMDs) in Iraq, then "lost" them when the team was killed by so-called "friendly fire."
The Pentagon whistleblower, Nelda Rogers, is a 28-year veteran debriefer for the Defense Department. She has become so concerned for her safety that she decided to tell the story about this latest CIA-military fiasco in Iraq.
According to Al Martin Raw.com, "Ms. Rogers is number two in the chain of command within this DoD special intelligence office. This is a ten-person debriefing unit within the central debriefing office for the Department of Defense."
The information that is being leaked out is information "obtained while she was in Germany heading up the debriefing of returning service personnel, involved in intelligence work in Iraq for the Department of Defense and/or the Central Intelligence Agency.
"According to Ms. Rogers, there was a covert military operation that took place both preceding and during the hostilities in Iraq,"
A second story originating in the Iranian Mehr News Agency claimed:
Over the past few days, in the wake of the bombings in Karbala and the ideological disputes that delayed the signing of Iraq's interim constitution, there have been reports that U.S. forces have unloaded a large cargo of parts for constructing long-range missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the southern ports of Iraq.
A reliable source from the Iraqi Governing Council, speaking on condition of anonymity, told the Mehr News Agency that U.S. forces, with the help of British forces stationed in southern Iraq, had made extensive efforts to conceal their actions.
He added that the cargo was unloaded during the night as attention was still focused on the aftermath of the deadly bombings in Karbala and the signing of Iraq's interim constitution.
The source said that in order to avoid suspicion, ordinary cargo ships were used to download the cargo, which consisted of weapons produced in the 1980s and 1990s.
He mentioned the fact that the United States had facilitated Iraq's WMD program during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq and said that some of the weapons being downloaded are similar to those weapons, although international inspectors had announced Saddam Hussein's Baath regime had destroyed all its WMD.
The source went on to say that the rest of the weapons were probably transferred in vans to an unknown location somewhere in the vicinity of Basra overnight.
"Most of these weapons are of Eastern European origin and some parts are from the former Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. The U.S. obtained them through confiscations during sales of banned arms over the past two decades," he said.
I did find a statement by military authorities in Iraq that they knew nothing of these materials either being received or moved. Such a statement is not a denial that it happened, but merely of a lack of knowledge. This could be true for the officers making the statement even though the operation could have covertly taken place. If either of these reports describe actual events they would be regarded as prima-facie evidence for consciousness of guilt regarding belief that WMDs actually existed in Iraq.
Misdirection can also be such evidence. Shortly after the war began Bush apologists began to apply the WMD term to Saddam himself.
It doesn't matter what Hans Blix, the Ken Starr of the UN says about weaponry. It doesn't matter whether we find any weapons of mass destruct ion. Saddam Hussein is a weapon of mass destruction… Rush Limbaugh, April 23, 2003
We will win the war in Iraq and the war is justified because Saddam Hussein is a Weapon of Mass Destruction. Julliani at the RNC in NY
Redirecting the definition of WMDs (from biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons that could be placed in terrorist hands) to the ruler of Baghdad, and using that redefinition as a justification for the war, again suggests consciousness of guilt for involving America in a preemptive strike against Iraq. There was also a new emphasis in the other reasons for war that Wolfowitz said could not be agreed on.
Another redirection was claiming that those who questioned the rationale for the war (as WMDs were not found) were “not supporting our troops” and were virtual traitors in a time of war.
Was Intelligence Fully Agreed?
We open this section with an extended statement from Senator Carl Levin, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee. In that capacity he has earned a reputation as a strong supporter of our national defense and an effective waste fighter. He was an early and consistent advocate of efforts to prepare the American military to combat terrorism and other emerging threats of the post-Cold War world. Senator Levin has been a strong advocate on behalf of our service men and women. With his strong stance for America’s defense, this statement from the congressional record is powerful and important evidence.
Congressional Record: March 2, 2004 (Senate)Page S2010-S2011 IRAQ INTELLIGENCE Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the question of whether or not the intelligence was flawed which was used so forcefully by the administration prior to going to war as the reason for going to war is a question which is going to consume the time of this body and a number of our committees for some time to come. It is a critically important question as to whether or not the intelligence was flawed, not just in terms of the accountability--which is so important if mistakes were made, if exaggerations were undertaken in order to advance the decision to go to war--but also in terms of the future security of this Nation. This country went to war, we were told, because Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. That was the reason that was given over and over again by the administration. Whether or not there were other reasons, and there surely were, for that decision, which could be argued as a basis for the decision, the facts are that the American people were told it was the presence in Iraq of weapons of mass destruction which was the basis for attacking that country. When a decision is made to go to war based on intelligence, it is a fateful decision. It has ramifications and impacts way beyond the current months and years. If the intelligence is as flawed as this intelligence was, we should find out why. Whether people are glad we went to war or are not glad we went to war, whether history will prove we should have waited until we had greater support through the United Nations in order to avoid the kind of aftermath which we have seen, or not--we don't know what history is going to show in that regard--but regardless of the arguments back and forth as to the timing of it, the way in which it was handled, the failure to galvanize the international community so we had a broad array of countries with us, including Muslim nations so we would not be there as a Western occupying power with other Western nations after the military success; whether or not there was adequate planning for the aftermath, and I think it is obvious that there was not adequate planning, but regardless of what position one takes on all of those issues, it is incumbent upon us to find out how in Heaven's name the intelligence could be so far off. How could we have 120 top suspect sites for the presence of weapons of mass destruction that were high-level to medium-level sites, where there was confidence that there were weapons of mass destruction either being stored or produced, and we batted zero for 120? How could we be so far off? How is it possible that the CIA could tell us, as they did in their assessments, that there were chemical weapons and biological weapons and that a nuclear program was being undertaken again when, in fact, that apparently is not the case? How is it possible that intelligence can be as flawed as is this intelligence? Again, regardless of what the arguments are on any side or any issue, I don't think any of us should be in the position of arguing that it is irrelevant to the future security of this Nation whether or not the intelligence upon which the decision to go to war was based is important. It is critically important. Does North Korea have nuclear weapons or doesn't it have nuclear weapons? Should we put some credibility in the intelligence community's assessment of that? Where is Iran along the continuum of obtaining nuclear weapons? What are their intentions? Should we put confidence in the intelligence community's assessment of that? Whether or not we place confidence or make decisions based upon the intelligence community's assessment is critically important. The lives of young men and women, perhaps the life of this Nation, could be dependent upon intelligence which is being assessed by the intelligence community. Life and death decisions are being made by the President of the United States based on decisions and assessments and appraisals of the intelligence community. When it is as wildly off as this intelligence community's assessments apparently were, then it seems to me we better find out for the future health of this country, not just in terms of trying to assess the accountability for past assessments. Something happened to the intelligence after 9/11. The pre-2002 intelligence assessments relative to nuclear programs and biological programs and chemical programs were different from the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate. Some of this has been set forth in the Carnegie Endowment's recent report. There are so many examples of where the intelligence shifted on these critical issues after 9/11. A few examples: On the reconstitution of the nuclear program after 1998, the pre-2002 intelligence assessment was that Iraq had probably not continued their research and development program relative to reconstituting a nuclear program after 1998. Yet in October 2002, the intelligence community said, yes, it has restarted its nuclear program after the United Nations left in 1998. What happened between the pre-2002 intelligence assessment and the post-9/11 assessment?[[Page S2011]] What about enriching uranium for use in nuclear weapons? Prior to 2002, the assessment was that Baghdad may be attempting to acquire materials that could be used to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program. But after 9/11, in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, we have, yes, Iraq has imported aluminum tubes and high-strength magnets. The Department of Energy's disagreement with this conclusion was set forth, but the assessment of the intelligence community shifted after 9/11. Whether they attempted to purchase uranium from abroad, the same kind of shift in the intelligence assessment, there were no reports mentioning any attempts to acquire uranium prior to that 2002 assessment, but in 2002, October, suddenly the National Intelligence Assessment says Iraq has been trying to procure uranium ore and yellow cake. Again, disagreement from the Department of State, but that was the assessment of the intelligence community, and on and on. We have this kind of change that occurred in the intelligence assessments. What is the explanation for that? What happened? There is no evidence, as the President has mentioned; there is no evidence that Saddam Hussein was part of the attack of 9/11, so what happened that caused the intelligence community to shift its assessment of chemical, biological, and nuclear programs after the 9/11 attack on us? That is something which we must find out. We must make a determination--hopefully someday there will be an outside commission which will make a comprehensive review of this whole matter--but, in any event, we must do the best we can through the Intelligence Committee. I am making an effort, the Armed Services Committee, my staff, to look into these issues, particularly as they relate to the question of how intelligence affected the operations and the planning relative to our military effort in Iraq. But we must make that decision. We have an obligation. This is not a partisan issue and it makes no difference to me whether this assessment is finished before the election or after the election. It must be made for the health of this Nation, as to how our intelligence community, No. 1, could be so totally wrong relative to the presence of weapons of mass destruction on Iraqi soil immediately prior to the war; and, No. 2, how and why did the intelligence community shift its assessments so significantly after 9/11 from the assessments that occurred before 9/11? There is another aspect of this which relates to the way in which intelligence was used or exaggerated by the policymakers. Here we have another issue--an issue which is going to be looked at by the Intelligence Committee at least as far as the use of the intelligence is concerned up to the point where the war began. There are some recent statements that I think also require explanation. I have tried a number of times to find out how the Vice President could have, about a month ago, made a statement relative to the vans that were found in Iraq, that those vans were part of a mobile biological weapons program. For the life of me, I do not understand how the Vice President can make that statement when Dr. Kay who has looked at the van has said that there is a consensus in the intelligence community--and I am now reading from Dr. Kay's answer to my question in the Armed Services Committee--that the consensus opinion is that those two trailers were not intended for the production of biological weapons. How is it that the Vice President of the United States at about the same time that statement was made before the Armed Services Committee by the chief weapons inspector--that some trailers which were found in Iraq are unrelated to a biological weapons program--would say the opposite in a very public forum? What is the basis for the Vice President's statement? I tried to find out. In fact, I wrote the Vice President the other day asking him: What is the basis for your statement? We should know. The American people should know when the Vice President says something as significant as that, that these particular vans which we have now gotten in our possession are, in fact, biological weapons laboratories. In fact, what the Vice President said on January 22 on NPR was: I would deem that-- Here he is referring to those two vans-- conclusive evidence that Saddam did in fact have programs for weapons of mass destruction. Again, this is so totally opposite from what our chief weapons inspector has decided and said the consensus opinion is--that surely the American public is entitled to an explanation from the Vice President. What is the basis for his statement of January 22 on national radio? What is the basis, Mr. Vice President, for your statement? The American public is entitled to know that. This is not some assistant secretary of some agency sitting in the bowels of the Pentagon or the bowels of some other building. This is the Vice President of the United States who is saying on national radio that we believe, in fact, that those semi-trailers were part of the biological weapons program, that they were biological weapons vans. There is no explanation forthcoming, just sort of silence from the Office of the Vice President. We are entitled to more than that. One possibility which the CIA's Director suggested when I asked him the question was that, well, maybe the Vice President was using old information when he said that. If the Vice President of the United States is making statements of significance based on old information, first, it seems to me he ought to say so and then say, Too bad that happened, I will make sure it doesn't happen again. But it is also kind of discouraging, if that is true. There are daily briefings which I assume he is a part of--at least weekly briefings on these critical issues. We have a chief weapons inspector who says those vans, according to the consensus opinion, are not part of and were not part of the production of biological weapons. But what all this is part of is kind of what is going to be phase 2 of the Intelligence Committee's investigation which is the use of intelligence by the policymakers. Here the statements of our top leadership go beyond the intelligence in a number of ways. They are much more certain than the intelligence communities' assessments were. For instance, the Vice President, on August 2002, said the following: There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use against our friends and against our allies and against us. We have this additional aspect which is now being looked into by the Intelligence Committee and again by my staff on the Armed Services Committee as to how the administration could take the intelligence that was given and then turn those less certain findings into certainties. Our friend from Arizona, Senator Kyl, made the point earlier tonight that there is a lot of uncertainty in intelligence, and he surely is right. But wow. It sure doesn't sound that way coming from the administration prior to the war. Vice President Cheney told Tim Russert: We know with absolute certainty that Saddam is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment he needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nuclear weapon. Secretary of State Colin Powell--and this will be my last comment--said at the U.N.: There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons. The list of these statements where there is no doubt and there is absolute certainty that the administration says exists about these programs goes beyond what the intelligence communities' assessments were. It is those statements of absolute certainty which, it seems to me, require an explanation as to what was the basis of those statements of absolute certainty and there being no doubt, particularly in light of the fact Senator Kyl pointed out that intelligence is, indeed, very uncertain and should be treated that way. I yield the floor.
Mr. Levin, as a ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee had access to high level data, was a supporter of our military and national security, and therefore should have been aware at the highest congressional level of the data available. His analysis of what seems to have happened as therefore highly apropos. The following statements seem to support his view of the intelligence as late as the summer of 2001.
Colin Powell, February 2001: "[Saddam] has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He is unable to project conventional power against his neighbors. So in effect, our policies have strengthened the security of the neighbors of Iraq."
Condoleezza Rice, July 2001: "We are able to keep his arms from him. His military forces have not been rebuilt."
It is clear that the Secretary of State and Bush’s National Security Advisor believed that the consensus of intelligence in mid 2001 was that Saddam had no WMD capability. Mr. Levin noted a dramatic change in the administration’s posture a year later, accompanied by a certainty of accuracy. Was this change due to new intelligence of extremely high reliability? We need to examine the evidence that was set forth and contemporary analyses of that evidence. We listed several intelligence “proofs” the administration gave for Saddam’s WMD program near the top of this presentation. We will now more closely examine the facts surrounding those “proofs”.
Nigerian Yellow Cake
As cited at the start, Mr. Rycroft had stated in a top secret British memo that “the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.” This subject seems to powerfully support that analysis. As late as the 2003 State of the Union message, the President referred to it. The negative reaction was immediate and forceful. Joe Wilson made public his report that there was no evidence so support an effort to purchase from Niger. The CIA revealed that months before they had informed the administration that evidence for a Nigerian deal was unreliable. And the IAEA reported that the documents supposedly supporting a Nigerian purchase effort were forged.
The President’s words were carefully crafted so that what he said was not technically a lie, but nevertheless gave credence to a lie. The British had indeed recently report that Saddam had tried to buy yellow cake from Africa. But Bush and his backers knew that the source intelligence had long since been discredited. Why this happened might best be described by the President’s own description of his job.
See, in my line of work you got to keep repeating things over and over and over again for the truth to sink in, to kind of catapult the propaganda. George Bush speech, May 24, 2005
This president becomes firmly convinced about a course of action, separates himself from contrary opinion, and drums the matter to death until enough people believe his opinion.
The Aluminum Tubes
The Bush administration cited a purchase of aluminum tubes by Iraq as proof that Saddam had revitalized his nuclear program. The president claimed that these tubes were only useful in enrichment centrifuges, and the fact that Saddam paid a high price for them proved his intent. The softness of that case is made clear in this Washington Post from late summer of 2002.
…in its white paper on Iraq released to the United Nations last week, the Bush administration cited the seized shipments as evidence that Iraq is actively seeking to develop nuclear weapons. Bush's national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, said in a televised interview that the tubes "are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs."
Since then, U.S. officials have acknowledged differing opinions within the U.S. intelligence community about possible uses for the tubes -- with some experts contending that a more plausible explanation was that the aluminum was meant to build launch tubes for Iraq's artillery rockets.
"But the majority view, held by senior officials here, is that they were most likely intended for gas centrifuges," one U.S. intelligence official said in an interview.
The new report questions that conclusion on several grounds, most of them technical. It says the seized tubes were made of a kind of aluminum that is ill-suited for welding. Other specifications of the imported metal are at odds with what is known about Iraq's previous attempts to build centrifuges. In fact, the report said, Iraq had largely abandoned aluminum for other materials, such as specialized steel and carbon fiber, in its centrifuges at the time its nuclear program was destroyed by allied bombers in the Gulf War.
According to Albright, government experts on nuclear technology who dissented from the Bush administration's view told him they were expected to remain silent. Washington Post, September 19, 2002
A report by The Institute for Science and International Security issued on March 10, 2003 declared:
The CIA has concluded that these tubes were specifically manufactured for use in gas centrifuges to enrich uranium. Many in the expert community both inside and outside government, however, do not agree with this conclusion. The vast majority of gas centrifuge experts in this country and abroad who are knowledgeable about this case reject the CIA's case and do not believe that the tubes are specifically designed for gas centrifuges. In addition, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors have consistently expressed skepticism that the tubes are for centrifuges. In his February 7, 2003 report to the UN Security Council, Mohamed El Baradei, the IAEA's Director General, said: "Based on available evidence, the IAEA team has concluded that Iraq's efforts to import these aluminum tubes were not likely to have been related to the manufacture of centrifuges." Authored by David Albright
Nevertheless Secretary of State, Powell went to the UN after the El Baradei statement insisting the tubes were for centrifuges, and the administration maintained this stance right up to the war. Today we know with certainty that the administration’s stance was wrong, though they then presented it as a certainty.
The Mobile WMD Labs
In his 2003 State of the Union speech the President declared:
From three Iraqi defectors we know that Iraq, in the late 1990s, had several mobile biological weapons labs. These are designed to produce germ warfare agents, and can be moved from place to a place to evade inspectors. Saddam Hussein has not disclosed these facilities.
Remember that the president described his job as “you got to keep repeating things over and over and over again for the truth to sink in, to kind of catapult the propaganda.” Was this statement “truth” or propaganda? Look at the facts.
…the president's intelligence commission, chaired by former appellate judge Laurence H. Silberman and former senator Charles S. Robb (D-Va.), disclosed that senior intelligence officials had serious questions about "Curveball," the code name for an Iraqi informant who provided the key information on Hussein's alleged mobile biological facilities.
The CIA clandestine service's European division chief had met in 2002 with a German intelligence officer whose service was handling Curveball. The German said his service "was not sure whether Curveball was actually telling the truth," according to the commission report. When it appeared that Curveball's material would be in Bush's State of the Union speech, the CIA Berlin station chief was asked to get the Germans to allow him to question Curveball directly.
On the day before the president's speech, the Berlin station chief warned about using Curveball's information on the mobile biological units in Bush's speech. The station chief warned that the German intelligence service considered Curveball "problematical" and said its officers had been unable to confirm his assertions. The station chief recommended that CIA headquarters give "serious consideration" before using that unverified information, according to the commission report. Washington Post, Sunday, May 22, 2005
In spite of the questionable nature of the source the propaganda continued:
A week later, Powell said in an address to the United Nations that the information on mobile labs came from four defectors, and he described one as "an eyewitness . . . who supervised one of these facilities" and was at the site when an accident killed 12 technicians.
Within a year, doubts emerged about the truthfulness of all four, and the "eyewitness" turned out to be Curveball, the informant the CIA station chief had red-flagged as unreliable. Curveball was subsequently determined to be a fabricator who had been fired from the Iraqi facility years before the alleged accident, according to the commission and Senate reports. Washington Post, Sunday, May 22, 2005
It is clear indeed that “the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.”
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Can Attack U.S.
The Bush administration scared the American public with statements that Saddam had aerial vehicles that could be used to deliver WMDs on US soil. Here is an overview of the facts based on the President’s Intelligence Commission report.
In an Oct. 7, 2002, speech, Bush mentioned a potential threat to the U.S. mainland being explored by Iraq through unmanned aircraft "that could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons." The basis for that analysis was a single report that an Iraqi general in late 2000 or early 2001 indicated interest in buying autopilots and gyroscopes for Hussein's UAV program. The manufacturer automatically included topographic mapping software of the United States in the package.
When the list was submitted in early 2002, the manufacturer's distributor determined that the U.S. mapping software would not be included in the autopilot package, and told the procurement agent in March 2002. By then, however, U.S. intelligence, which closely followed Iraqi procurement of such material, had already concluded as early as the summer of 2001 that this was the "first indication that the UAVs might be used to target the U.S."
When a foreign intelligence service questioned the procurement agent, he originally said he had never intended to purchase the U.S. mapping software, but he refused to submit to a thorough examination, according to the president's commission. "By fall 2002, the CIA was still uncertain whether the procurement agent was lying," the commission said. Nonetheless, a National Intelligence Estimate in October 2002 said the attempted procurement "strongly suggested" Iraq was interested in targeting UAVs on the United States. Senior members of Congress were told in September 2002 that this was the "smoking gun" in a special briefing by Vice President Cheney and then-CIA Director George J. Tenet.
By January 2003, however, it became publicly known that the director of Air Force intelligence dissented from the view that UAVs were to be used for biological or chemical delivery, saying instead they were for reconnaissance. In addition, according to the president's commission, the CIA "increasingly believed that the attempted purchase of the mapping software . . . may have been inadvertent."
In an intelligence estimate on threats to the U.S. homeland published in January 2003, Air Force, Defense Intelligence Agency and Army analysts agreed that the proposed purchase was "not necessarily indicative of an intent to target the U.S. homeland." Washington Post, Sunday, May 22, 2005
Saddam’s Brother-In-Law
Sometimes the “propaganda” involved outright lies and deception. Saddam’s brother-in-law, Hussein Kamel al-Majid, defected to the west for a year. When he returned t Iraq he was executed. While in defection he gave extensive testimony about Iraq’s WMD and other weapons programs. The text of his testimony was publicly unavailable until it was exposed on February 24, 2003, by Newsweek. The content of that Newsweek article was important because it clearly contradicted statements made by Blair and the Bush administration to bolster their war plans. As a result, CIA spokesman Bill Harlow claimed the Newsweek article was “…incorrect, bogus, wrong, untrue…” Reuters, February 24, 2003. However, on Wednesday (26 February 2003), a complete copy of the Kamel transcript -- an internal UNSCOM/IAEA document stamped "sensitive" -- was obtained by Glen Rangwala, verifying the details reported in Newsweek.
This information was critical because of the posture Bush and Blair had taken based on Kamel’s testimony. We cite a few example statements.
· Prime Minister Tony Blair in his statement to the House of Commons on 25 February 2003, said: "It was only four years later after the defection of Saddam's son-in-law to Jordan, that the offensive biological weapons and the full extent of the nuclear programme were discovered."
· President Bush declared in a 7 October 2002 speech: "In 1995, after several years of deceit by the Iraqi regime, the head of Iraq's military industries defected. It was then that the regime was forced to admit that it had produced more than 30,000 liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents. The inspectors, however, concluded that Iraq had likely produced two to four times that amount. This is a massive stockpile of biological weapons that has never been accounted for, and capable of killing millions."
· Colin Powell's 5 February 2003 presentation to the UN Security Council claimed: "It took years for Iraq to finally admit that it had produced four tons of the deadly nerve agent, VX. A single drop of VX on the skin will kill in minutes. Four tons. The admission only came out after inspectors collected documentation as a result of the defection of Hussein Kamal, Saddam Hussein's late son-in-law." Citations quoted in http://middleeastreference.org.uk/kamel.html
The warmongers cited the weapons quantities described by Kamel, claiming those weapons and systems were unaccounted for. They failed to mention two key facts: Kamel was describing weapons that existed prior to the first Iraq war, and his frank discussion of weapons, components, and locations, also declared:
I ordered destruction of all chemical weapons. All weapons - biological, chemical, missile, nuclear were destroyed.
Nothing remained. transcript of Kamel interviews
He made extensive statements about plants converted to legitimate purposes and orders not to produce WMDs. He also stated that weapons destruction took place "after visits of inspection teams. You have important role in Iraq with this. You should not underestimate yourself. You are very effective in Iraq." Ibid.
Summary
Far from there being a consensus about Iraq’s WMDs, these cases cited here show that the members of the intelligence community closest to the facts in each instance expressed serious doubt as to the value of any intelligence. Furthermore, most knowledgeable experts in each field openly expressed doubts to the administration prior to the use of such intelligence. It is clear beyond question that “the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.”
How could the administration be convinced there were WMDs?
The Downing Street memo makes it clear that the decision to go to war was at least nearly firm by summer of 2002. It added that “the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.” Some close to the President had to be aware of these facts. These would notably be Wolfowitz, Rice, Rumsfeld, and others who had met with the British delegation. Communications between Blair and Bush that were recently uncovered suggest that the President himself was part of the conspiracy to make the case for war. The Republican controlled Senate Intelligence Committee blamed the failures on “group think.” The DSM, uncovered after the commission finished its report, makes it clear that this group think was really modifying facts to fit a predetermined policy.
In a highly critical report issued Friday, the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee found that the CIA's prewar estimates of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction were overstated and unsupported by intelligence.
Committee Chairman Pat Roberts, R-Kansas, told reporters that intelligence used to support the invasion of Iraq was based on assessments that were "unreasonable and largely unsupported by the available intelligence…."
Roberts said President Bush and Congress sent the country to war based on "flawed" information provided by the intelligence community.
He said the panel concluded that the intelligence community suffered "from what we call a collective group think, which led analysts and collectors and managers to presume that Iraq had active and growing WMD programs."
Roberts said this "group think caused the community to interpret ambiguous evidence, such as the procurement of dual-use technology, as conclusive evidence of the existence of WMD programs."
The report criticized the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense Human Intelligence Service for their handling of an informer code-named "Curveball," noting that the latter "demonstrated serious lapses in handling such an important source."
Over and over, the report noted, analysts had exaggerated what they knew and left out, glossed over or simply dismissed dissenting views.
The report said that the intelligence community eliminated caveats about assessments when it compiled a document hurriedly released to the public in October 2002, thus misrepresenting "their judgments to the public which did not have access to the classified National Intelligence Estimate containing the more carefully worded assessments." CNN Friday, July 9, 2004
We saw much earlier that the President had a style of separating himself from opponents to his beliefs. In the case of stem cell research this had a strong component in his personal religious convictions. He has expressed the view that his Iraq policy was also related to his belief that he was doing God’s will. Religious persuasion is one of the strongest motives to interpret facts in harmony with those beliefs. It is therefore strongly possible that this group think had its basis in the underlying convictions of this President, who could only view the evidence through the prejudicial glasses of his personal belief system.
What If They Truly Believed?
This in no way excuses the gross blunders in interpreting intelligence data. Nor does it explain how the military ignored suspected WMD sites in the drive to Baghdad. The administration has since claimed that because the outcome (the removal of Saddam) was good, then the means to that outcome are justified. They accuse those who question the means of preferring that Saddam remain in power. This argument seeks to divert attention from the need for honesty in our elected officials. While the outcome might be serendipitous, the insidious deceptions getting us there are unforgivable and must be dealt with to the full extent of the law.
